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Introduction 
In this paper we review countries’ diverse experiences to draw conclusions on the pitfalls and opportunities 
that are open through decentralisation of governments’ fiscal responsibilities to sub-central jurisdictions. We 
begin by reviewing the theoretical arguments for and against the decentralisation of spending responsibilities. 
We also provide a cross country comparison of the extent to which spending powers have been devolved in a 
range of European countries, putting each country’s position into a wider context. Second, we review some 
insights from the theory of fiscal federalism on fiscal autonomy and assess the extent of autonomy at sub-
central tiers of government in the same set of countries. We discuss the approaches that have been followed, 
and a number of the difficulties that particular countries have faced, as the fiscal autonomy of sub-central tiers 
of government has evolved. Our conclusions are set out in the final section. 
Decentralisation of Spending Responsibilities: 
Motivation 
In several cases, decentralisation has initially been motivated by political concerns, for example, in Spain it 
was seen as an essential part of the democratisation process. Elsewhere too, decentralisation has been a 
response to pressures from regional groups for more participation and control in the political process. At the 
extreme, it can represent an attempt to keep a country together in the face of such pressures either by granting 
greater autonomy to all regions, or, as in Spain, Italy and the UK, by forging asymmetric devolved powers. In 
these and other cases, important economic objectives include a wish to improve service delivery and to 
address perceived limitations of centralised administration. A more macroeconomic motivation relates to 
separation of issues of constraining the size of government, as determined at the centre, from issues of how to 
allocate a given level of spending, which may be determined at sub-central level. 
The economic theory of decentralisation draws on contributions by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and 
Oates (1972), an excellent overview is provided in Oates (1999). While there is broad agreement that central 
government should have responsibility for macroeconomic stabilisation, overall redistribution, and for 
functions providing clear collective benefits or spillovers (such as national defence, international relations and 
R&D), a key presumption made by supporters of decentralisation is that centralised provision in other areas 
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can be too uniform and relatively inflexible in the face of potentially diverse regional preferences and needs. 
Decentralisation can aim at increasing the role of those with greater knowledge of local preferences so that 
fiscal decisions made at the sub-national level better reflect regional diversity.  
Given regional diversity, Tiebout’s (1956) model of revealed preference predicts that consumers will choose 
to locate in jurisdictions that provide them with the mix of public services that maximise their welfare. The 
intention is that citizens who are dissatisfied with the pattern of provision in their area can, if they wish, move 
to areas where the pattern suits them better. So under certain assumptions, diversity of provision combined 
with consumer mobility can lead to Pareto optimal provision. 
In many respects the notion of ‘subsidiarity’, as proposed in the Maastricht Treaty and reasserted in the 
Amsterdam Treaty through the notion of bringing decisions as close as possible to the citizen, relates closely 
to this concept of efficiency in public service provision. The notion has received further impetus, both within 
individual EU states and from the EU’s Committee of the Regions. An additional benefit of bringing 
decisions closer to citizens is that this may promote their involvement in the democratic process, see for 
example, Tanzi (2000).  
The greater sensitivity of sub-central governments to local preferences may enhance the ability of the provider 
to identify both recipients and citizens’ willingness to pay. It is argued that people will be more willing to pay 
for services that they find to be responsive to their priorities, especially if i) they have been involved in the 
decision making process, and ii) if costs are clearly perceptible in that process. So, in short, decentralisation 
may result in a closer approximation to the efficient solution of provision to the point at which the marginal 
costs and benefits of provision are equated. 
Theory also has something to say about the optimal size of sub-central governments.  Oates’ (1972) classic 
work on fiscal federalism suggests that jurisdictions should be designed, and the assignment of public 
expenditures should be carried out, in such a way that provision is the responsibility of the jurisdiction 
representing the smallest possible area over which the benefits are distributed. Complete application of this 
principle would suggest that different services would be associated with jurisdictions of different optimal 
sizes. Obviously other inefficiencies would result from a multiplicity of tiers of government, but they key 
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principle is that the size of the sub-central tiers should be chosen to be suit the broad range of services 
provided.  
Finally, it has been suggested that decentralisation can foster innovation, in so far as diversity may result in 
greater experimentation and innovation in provision, and provide valuable information about potential 
improvements in policy design, e.g. through piloting new approaches. Though a necessary feature must then 
include some mechanism/forum for cross regional sharing of ideas/findings. 
Of course, there are arguments that suggest limits should be imposed on the extent of decentralisation of 
spending decisions. Central government is likely to be concerned about issues of equality of access to public 
services and uniformity, or at least an acceptable minimum, in standards of provision. These concerns are will 
be particularly strong in areas such as health and education, not least because electorates tend to perceive the 
accountability in these areas to lie with central government. Also, to the extent that the economic arguments 
outlined above motivate shared responsibilities of central and sub-central tiers of government, there may be 
increased administrative complexity, lack of transparency and potential clashes in competencies. These 
disadvantages could easily offset potential benefits. Oates’ work on optimal size of government suggests that 
centralised provision is appropriate in areas where economies of scale are pervasive. Areas where there are 
interregional spillovers also need to be considered carefully; whilst decentralised provision may still be 
feasible, this is likely to require compensating transfers.   
Comparative Evidence 
As things stand, there are sharp differences between European economies in the role played by regional and 
local government in service provision. Tables 1 and 2 provide internationally comparable information from 
IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) on public expenditure by level of government across a number of 
distinct functions and over time. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]  
The distinction between unitary and federal countries is perhaps more real than apparent. Whilst some 
federations assign major functions to regional/state jurisdictions, others do not, or retain control over a sub-set 
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of functions (eg. health in Germany and Switzerland and social security in Austria and Switzerland). In 
contrast, some unitary countries have engaged in considerable decentralisation.  
The figures show that Denmark has the most devolved system among the unitary countries, dating back to 
progressive reforms that began in 1970 and proceeded through that decade. In 1998, the sub-central tiers, 
municipalities and counties, accounted for 76% of all public sector staff (European Communities, 2001). The 
devolved responsibilities extend to the provision of a broad range of services, from primary education to care 
of the elderly and to the distribution of benefit payments. Daugaard (2002) argues that the pursuit of 
administrative efficiency, the ability to target services at recipients and political arguments such as the 
strengthening of local democracy have been important factors motivating this strategy. However, while 
Denmark is unusual in channelling social transfers through local governments, the central government 
remains the main payer. Refunds are paid from central to sub-central governments, so in reality the situation 
is the same as if the state handled benefits through their own local agencies and the incentives for efficiency 
gains e.g. through better targeting of benefits to recipients are unclear.  
Data limitations, Controls, Directives and Shared Competencies 
In general some caveats should be borne in mind when looking at GFS data. As noted by Pola (1999) and 
Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), it is difficult to disentangle the extent to which the raw measures of expenditure 
decentralisation really reflect local decision-making. First, although GFS provides a breakdown of 
expenditure by function and economic type, the statistics sometimes include not only expenditure on 
functions assigned solely to that jurisdiction, but also on those where the local government is simply 
delivering a service that is effectively controlled by a higher tier of government.  
To the extent that central governments continue to be seen, or see themselves, as accountable to their 
electorate they may fear the consequences of deterioration in standards of provision following decentralisation 
and may respond by using explicit directives. Common examples of areas in which central government 
direction goes beyond simple guidance are health and education. In such circumstances sub-national 
governments should be seen not as independent providers of public services, but as local agencies 
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implementing central government policies, Tanzi (2001). Unfortunately, where directives are used, the GFS 
data will overestimate the true extent of fiscal decentralisation.  
Controls imposed by central government are also frequently motivated by concerns over equality of access. 
For example, in Germany fiscal relations predominantly reflect the desire to create broadly equal living 
conditions across the Federation. Here areas of competencies tend to be shared among tiers of government. 
For example, on health care, the Federal government sets legal conditions, and provides the funds to finance 
operating costs for hospitals, while the Länder finance hospital investment and regulate capacity; and the 
Communities are responsible for delivery of local health care services, Wurzel (1999). There may be a trade-
off if shared competencies obscure the accountability of local administrations to citizens. 
In France too, shared responsibilities are an important characteristic of provision. For example, in education, 
the central government determines school curricula, certifies university degrees, administers personnel and 
makes overall plans for the location of educational establishments; the 22 Régions are responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of primary schools and lycées (which provide the last three years of secondary 
education), and for vocational training; whilst 96 Départements are responsible for the creation and 
maintenance of colleges that provide the first four years of secondary education. Likewise, policing is a 
shared responsibility of Municipalities (through mayors and gendarmes) and the centre (national police). In 
general, it is difficult to summarise simply, clearly and precisely how responsibilities are divided among tiers 
of government in France, but it is fair to say that the allocation across Régions is symmetric and their 
autonomy is limited. In Switzerland some two-thirds of tasks are shared between the centre, the federal states 
and the cantons, OECD (1997). 
In Germany, Austria and France, the precedence of the equalisation of provision over public choice and 
economic incentives may leave open the likelihood that resource allocation will remain inefficient and lack 
discretionary flexibility. In Norway too, whilst provision is on the face of it relatively decentralised, a 
proliferation of directives, norms and standards reflect concern over equality of access and limit the scope for 
local governments to adjust to local preferences. It is generally agreed that decentralisation should be 
carefully designed to be transparent, with clearly defined competencies for different jurisdictions. In areas 
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where the central government wants to retain a major role in setting standards of provision we would argue it 
should take back financing responsibility accordingly, and elsewhere it should abstain from detailed 
regulation. If necessary, setting defined minimum standards should replace notions of standard entitlements 
and autonomy should be addressed in both spending and financing decisions if potential benefits are to be 
realised. 
Economies of Scale and Cross Regional Collaboration 
In general, inappropriate or poorly designed incentives for cooperation could work against any advantages of 
devolution. Indeed, the OECD has criticised some countries for offering insufficient incentives for cross 
regional collaboration, leaving scale economies in provision unexploited, see, for example Joumard and 
Suyker (2002a and 2002b). However, in areas with low population density the potential gains from regional 
collaboration in the provision of services such as primary education and care of the elderly are likely to be 
negligible, while in more densely populated regions, and more generally in the provision of some other 
services eg. roads and water supply, cross regional provision is prevalent. In some countries, eg. Finland, 
voluntary associations result in close co-operation on a regional basis, elsewhere formal cross-payment 
systems may exist to compensate jurisdictions for providing services to out-of-area recipients. 
The Decentralisation Process and Asymmetries 
Table 2 shows that across most countries, decentralisation has been stable over time. However, there are some 
notable exceptions. In Italy, regions were given greater powers in the 1970s and early1980s 1, during which 
time sub-central government spending doubled from 7 to 14 per cent of GDP (Bibbee and Goglio, 2002). 
Italian regional governments now have primary responsibility over matters such as health, vocational 
education and training, economic development, public works and the environment. However, the process has 
not been smooth. Particular challenges have arisen in the area of regional development, where central 
authorities have doubted the ability of lower tier administrations to manage investment projects properly, 
Giarda (2000). In addition, as we shall discuss later, devolution of spending preceded any significant increase 
in financial autonomy of the regions creating other problems. 
                                                               
1 Unfortunately GFS data for Italy is not available for this period. 
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In Spain, as noted earlier, decentralisation became an important component of the transition to democracy 
embodied in the 1978 constitution and has been progressive. Regional governments’ share in general 
government expenditure rose from 11 per cent in 1980 to 32 per cent (close to the OECD average) in 1997, 
see Table 2 (and Figure 4b). The progressive transfer of primary and secondary education to Autonomous 
Communities (ACs) was completed in 2001 and a similar process is set to see the transition of health 
spending and non-university education to all ACs by 2004. However, many competencies again remain 
shared between the four tiers of government (State, ACs, Provinces and Municipalities). There is additional 
complexity in so far as asymmetries remain between the functions assimilated by the “fast track 
decentralisation” ACs (the Basque country, Navarra, Andalucia, the Canaries and Valencia) and those 
available to the 10 “slow track” ACs and asymmetries across the “slow track” ACs, which have been given 
the option to assimilate fewer devolved powers over a more protracted period, see Joumard and Varoudakis 
(2000). However, it is fair to say that progress is being made on a framework to extend and standardise 
powers. 
In general the UK has imposed considerable consistency on the shape of its local government by explicitly 
allocating functions to different tiers and generally avoiding clashes of competencies. More recently, the 
creation devolved administrations for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in 1999 has changed the nature of 
sub-central government but has not so far had a major impact on the degree to which expenditure is assigned 
to sub -national jurisdictions. The remits of the UK’s devolved administrations are clearly defined, though for 
historical reasons, the devolved territories have been granted different political and economic powers. For 
example, Scotland has much more exclusive control of functions such as education and health even when 
compared to many more devolved unitary states. Whilst the blueprints for English regional government are 
not yet entirely clear, it is already apparent that the ultimate pattern of devolution in the UK will not be 
symmetric. This is explicitly recognised in Russell Barter (2000), which in fact exalts asymmetry as a virtue, 
in so far as regions are not forced to take on responsibilities they are not yet ready to bear.  
However, political scientists, for example, Le Galès and John (1997), argue that incrementalism carries 
considerable costs in terms of loss of momentum for reform, while asymmetries across regions may result in 
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to the opposite problem by giving rise to arguments for further change.  In Italy, five special status regions 
(Regioni a Statuto Speciale) have traditionally had greater devolved powers, but the federalist movement has 
been pushing for similar autonomies to be granted to all regions to bring the asymmetric treatment of regions 
to an end.  
Fiscal Autonomy 
Theory 
Having looked at how expenditure responsibilities are allocated, it is natural to consider how these should be 
financed. The theory of fiscal federalism provides a number of arguments for sub-central fiscal autonomy 
(see, for example, Gramlich, 1984).  
First, it is argued that heavy reliance on grants and other centrally distributed revenues places too little 
pressure on local administrators and politicians to manage spending efficiently. Devolving fiscal authority is 
seen as important to ensure that financing and expenditure responsibilities are linked at the margin, so that 
local politicians can bear the costs of their decisions. Second, it is important that the costs of services are 
perceptible to the electorate so that they can make meaningful decisions on alternatives. 
However, the literature on fiscal federalism also provides clear guidance on the limits that should be imposed 
on fiscal autonomy. Four arguments can be highlighted here. First, the usual argument against complete fiscal 
autonomy is one of equity. Jurisdictions with different levels of income and wealth will have very different 
tax resources at their disposal, and the need to ensure that citizens have access to a roughly equal level of 
public services will imply some degree of redistribution between sub-central governments. For this reason no 
industrialised countries, not even federal states, have opted for complete fiscal autonomy. A number of 
approaches to redistribution are feasible, through the use of vertical transfers funded from general taxation, 
‘pooling’ arrangements between sub -central governments, or tax-sharing arrangements designed to benefit 
poorer jurisdictions. It is certainly important that sub-central governments have access to sufficient funds to 
adequately cover their spending responsibilities. Clearly there is a trade-off between equity and 
accountability: if resources are shared equally between sub-central governments, the incentive effects from 
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fiscal autonomy disappear. This has become one of the key issues that countries have to face in deciding the 
appropriate level of fiscal autonomy for sub-central tiers of government. 
The second argument against complete fiscal autonomy is that one has to avoid tax externalities, in the 
interests of economic efficiency. ‘Tax exportation’, McLure (1967), is one such problem. If taxation decisions 
by sub -central governments impinge on non-residents, then local residents and politicians will not internalise 
the costs of public services and there is likely to be a degree of over-provision. Of course, insofar as non-
residents benefit from service provision, then there could be under-provision, a problem that often arises with 
large metropolitan areas and satellite towns. The way to deal with this problem is to ensure that different types 
of taxes are assigned to different levels of government so as to avoid tax exportation between sub-national 
jurisdictions. 
A third limit on fiscal autonomy is a consequence of the potential migration of factors of production. Tax 
competition is a fact of life in most systems, and the mobilit y of capital and labour imposes natural limits on 
fiscal autonomy. This is why most decentralised taxation systems still assign the majority of ability-to-pay or 
redistributive taxes to central government, especially corporate taxes, which fall on the most mobile factor, 
capital. Most countries that have opted for a substantial degree of fiscal autonomy have tended to rely on 
benefit taxes or user charges (based on the benefit consumers derive from local services) and taxes on 
immobile factors such as property, or small changes in ability-to-pay taxes (such as local income tax), where 
limits may be applied to prevent tax-induced migration flows across regions.  
Finally, the fourth argument against fiscal decentralisation is that it can generate administrative complexity. In 
essence, it is argued that managing a national tax system is feasible at lower cost and this implies that 
financing systems based on grants or tax-sharing arrangements are optimal. In fact, in the case of any modern 
developed economy, this  is a spurious argument. There is no reason why one needs to decentralise the tax 
collection system, as evidenced by a number of OECD countries which manage the collection of taxes shared 
by different jurisdictions through a single national tax collection system. However, clearly if a national 
collection system had to cope with a plethora of shared taxes between jurisdictions, this would increase 
administrative costs. 
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A subtler version of this argument relates to the problem of transparency and complexity in decentralised tax 
systems. A complex tax system, where various jurisdictions share the same tax base, and where sub-central 
governments have important fiscal powers, may lead to a less transparency in the fiscal system, unless 
attention is devoted to carefully construction and presentation of the chosen system. It is important that voters 
understand the operations of the different levels of government if accountability is to be achieved (Tanzi, 
2001).  
To sum up, economic theory suggests that some degree of fiscal autonomy can render policy-makers more 
accountable, and may improve economic efficiency.  
Various commentators have also suggested that part of the crisis in democratic participation in local 
government elections in the several countries, including France and the UK, is attributable to the lack of fiscal 
powers available to sub-central governments. For example, The Economist (2002) argues that the problem of 
democratic participation in local and devolved government will not be solved if the proposed English regional 
assemblies are granted few economic powers. It has been suggested that voter interest will dwindle in 
devolved government in Scotland and Wales in the absence of further devolution of fiscal powers, and 
whether further decentralisation of powers in the UK and France will rekindle participation of the electorate 
in local elections remains to be seen.  
Fiscal autonomy in practice 
Once again, internationally comparable data are available from GFS which separate sub-central governments’ 
sources of revenues into grants, taxes and ‘other’ sources, predominantly user charges and fees. This 
information is summarised in Figure 1.  
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
Grants  
As noted above, the potential benefits of decentralisation may cease to exist if local governments suffer from 
a poor capacity to implement spending. Redistribution via transfers of nationally collected tax across local 
jurisdictions is generally used to ensure that an adequate level of provision can be achieved no matter how 
strong or weak the taxing capacity of the sub-central jurisdiction.  
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In addition, if regions are subject to different cyclical developments the pooling of risks can raise welfare. 
Pooling may be achieved more easily through vertical transfers from the centre to the regions rather than 
through horizontal transfers between independent localities, see Oates (1972) and Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1976). In general, transfers can take three forms i) a grant from a higher tier of government or ii) an 
allocation of a share in nationally collected or pooled taxes.  
A further attraction of block grants relates to macroeconomic control. Central government may try to guard 
against growth of the public sector by limiting or cutting block grants. To the extent that it is block grants and 
rather than ear marked grants that are reduced, the sub-central tier is responsible for distributing the restricted 
or declining resources between individual services. 
It is immediately clear that the UK has traditionally financed most of the spending of its  sub-national 
jurisdictions through grants. This heavy reliance on grant funding presents a striking contrast with most 
European countries (with the exceptions of Ireland and the Netherlands, which are geographically much 
smaller)2.   
Most countries operate some kind of agreed and transparent formulae-based allocation of transfers, in part to 
eliminate costs of frequent negotiations. Equalisation schemes have the advantage of discouraging 
competition between authorities to attract higher-than-average earners with low needs, though at the same 
time overly generous equalisation formulae can weaken the incentives to attract residents by improving the 
quality of services or being more efficient. Furthermore, if tax collection is the responsibility of regions prior 
to central pooling and redistribution then it is also possible that richer regions will put less effort in the task. 
These concerns have led some countries to cap the extent of revenue equalisation.  
Spain has taken a different approach in allowing ACs to retain a proportion of any positive deviation from the 
budgeted increase in receipts (tied to the growth of a basket of taxes including personal and corporate income 
taxes and VAT) Joumard and Varoudakis (2002). In the Scandinavian countries equalisation schemes are 
based upon the tax base and potential revenues based on the average tax rate, rather than actual revenues, see 
                                                               
2 Note that in line with the earlier discussion, the relatively high dependence on grants in Denmark in part 
reflects 100% transfer refunding. 
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Mønnesland (2002). Many countries leave the responsibility for tax collection with central government, which 
can ensure equal effort in put into collection across the country and can be administratively easier, even if 
there is a system of local tax surcharges.  
In many cases equalisation schemes are self financing. In Sweden one such scheme has covered all the 
Municipalities and Counties since 1996; it aims to offset 95% of the differences in taxable income per capita 
between local governments and allows for major differences in service delivery costs. In Denmark a grant is 
payable to local authorities with a tax base per capita below 90% of the national average. Again, the size of 
the grant paid is based on expenditure need and is evaluated using a range of demographic and social 
indicators, see OECD (1997). 
In Spain a variety of grant formulae have been put in place, the most important of which is redistributes 
pooled tax revenues based on expenditure need as measured by population size, personal income and tax 
capacity. Additional criteria at the provincial and municipal levels include surface area and school-age 
population. The slow delegation of revenue raising powers in Spain has in part reflected the need to collect 
relevant information on costs of provision as well as differing needs and preferences, most of which was 
unavailable before, so Spain’s sub-central fiscal autonomy and the formulae employed are continuing to 
evolve. 
In France, where autonomy is more limited, a third of the funds available to sub-central government are in the 
form of grants. The main grant, the Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement  uses objective factors based on need 
(population, school population, tourist numbers, and fiscal capacity). Separate allocations are made for capital 
grants, Dotation Globale d’Equipement, which tend to support local initiatives by matching investments by 
Communes and Départments, 
Post-war Germany has operated a system of horizontal equalisation aimed at equalising revenues between 
poorer and richer Länder. This system, the Finanzausgleich, has been very successful in maintaining a high 
degree of uniformity in public services throughout Germany. In 1997, following the incorporation of the East 
German Länder into the system, €6.1 bn was transferred from the richer to the poorer Länder, compared to 
only €1.5 bn in 1994. In addition to these horizontal transfers, a number of federal grants were made to 
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fiscally weaker Länder (€7.2 bn in 1997), see OECD (1998). Overall, 20% of Länder revenues came from 
grants, including transfer payments from the equalisation system. In 2001, a new agreement was reached for 
the period 2005-19 which maintains a federal contribution of about €10 bn per year, OECD (2002). Some 
observers have argued that this extent of equalisation has led to a lack of accountability, see Spahn and Franz, 
(2000). Whilst the reforms have attempted to addressed a perceived need to incentivise the Länders’ 
performance and efficiency, equity remains a guiding principle of the new system. 
A different set of difficulties arise when allocations are closely linked to historical shares. This is likely to 
place too little emphasis on efficiency and the containment of spending. For this reason, with very few 
exceptions, European countries have moved away from allocation formulae based on historic shares, such as 
the UK’s Barnett formulae, towards formulae that use objective parameters that measure fiscal need and tax-
raising capacity.  
Whilst the UK has always had a system of grant allocation based on fiscal need for local government, it has 
resisted any reform of the Barnett formulae for the allocation of block grants to its main devolved regions (see 
Twigger (1998) for an explanation of the formulae). In doing this, the UK remains, with Italy, one of the few 
countries that has resisted the trend towards needs-based formulae and stuck with history and political 
expediency. However, there is growing recognition that any further move towards financial autonomy for the 
UK’s main devolved units will bring with it a need to address the issue of horizontal equalisation and will 
require some reform of the grant system, see for example, Muscatelli (2001) and Cuthbert (2001). Further 
progress on the devolution agenda, such as the creation of regional assemblies in England, will also bring the 
issue of needs assessments to the fore. 
In many countries, both equity considerations and electoral concerns strongly influence central governments’ 
funding of sub-central tiers. We have already discussed the use of central government directives to influence 
spending decisions, but constraints attached to funding may also be used to exercise control on local 
provision. The use of earmarked, conditional or matching grants may be more easily justified if there is 
evidence of strong inter-regional spill-over effects from the provision of particular services though it’s also 
arguable that, where these effects are perv asive, the provision and funding of such services might be more 
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appropriately retained by central government. This was certainly a key factor motivating the recent shift of the 
responsibility for hospitals back to central government in Norway3.   
The form of the restrictions imposed obviously affects the nature of the budget constraints facing the sub-
central tiers of government and this can give rise to the so called ‘fly paper effect’ - that is that grants “stick 
where they hit”, resulting in a different allocation than would arise from the same marginal change in own tax 
revenues, see for example, Courant et al. (1981). 
Given the distortions involved, the heavy use of earmarked grants has been criticised on efficiency grounds 
and recent reforms in Norway and elsewhere have resulted in the greater use of transfers through the income 
system, with the objective of increasing local government freedom to decide how to use the money, 
responding to citizens’ preferences and increasing cost efficiency, whilst also continuing to place strong 
emphasis on equalisation of resources across the country. 
Specifically, in 1986 the Norwegian central government introduced the General Purpose Grant Scheme which 
replaced a system of about 50 earmarked grants. However, even after this reform, the share of funds tied to 
specific uses remains high by international standards; in 2001 conditional grants accounted for some 16% of 
local governments’ total financial resources, b and Suyker (2002b)4. Newer earmarked grants influence the 
supply of childcare, services for care of the elderly and the renovation of school buildings. Their continued 
use appears to reflect the central government’s perceptions of problems relating to weak service levels in 
priority sectors. In Sweden, some 90% of grants were earmarked until 1992, with extensive regulations on 
provision imposed. But there too, reforms aimed at improving the efficient use of local resources and 
encouraging innovation have now reduced that figure to around 25%, see Roseveare (2002). 
                                                               
3 This transfer was accompanied by a reduction in the block grant and the upper limit on local tax rates, 
matching the reduced county expenditure level. The transfer of capital equipment was compensated via ear-
marked grants. 
4 This figure will reflect shifts in finances following the transfer of hospital finances but may be distorted by 
the presence of ad hoc ear marked grants compensating for the transfer of capital equipment. Unfortunately 
intertemporal and cross country comparisons are not feasible since, to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
comprehensive source of internationally comp arable data on proportion of intergovernmental transfers that 
are earmarked or conditional as opposed to general purpose. 
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In general the use of earmarked grants erodes local accountability and the remaining benefits from sub-central 
provision are then less clear. Only block or untied grants are consistent with autonomy of local decisions. A 
further problem with grants is that costs of provision are less likely to be perceptible to citizens. If sub-central 
governments have access to their own taxes, this particular problem may be solved. 
Taxes 
GFS provides a single figure for sub-central tax revenues and does not distinguish between revenues collected 
through shared taxes, piggybacked taxes, or taxes that are completely locally determined. As noted above, 
shared taxes can be an attractive source of revenues given the potential benefits of pooling risk and the 
relatively low administrative costs involved. Many countries, including Norway, Germany and Austria make 
extensive use of such arrangements.  
In discussing fiscal autonomy it is relevant to consider the extent to which to which sub-central governments 
control their own tax base or tax rates. Using the classifications provided in OECD (1999) combined with the 
GFS data we are able to generate a weighted index of fiscal control that addresses this point. Specifically, the 
OECD use a classification of sub-central tax revenues ranging from (a) where the sub-central government can 
set both the tax rate and tax base, to (e), where central government sets both the base and the rate of taxation5. 
Tax sharing schemes (d) are divided into four categories from (d.1) where the sub-central government can 
determine the revenue split, to the other extreme (d.4) where the national government can unilaterally decide 
the revenue split.  
In Figure 2 we summarise this evidence. The vertical axis shows the tax revenues received by sub-central 
governments as a percentage of total tax revenues, so provides a measure of the importance of sub-central 
financing of public services. The horizontal axis plots a constructed index of ‘fiscal control’6, reflecting the 
extent to which tax revenues can be considered to be controlled at sub-central level. It follows that the 
                                                               
5 Although these data still neglect some important issues. For instance, comparative data have not so far been 
collected on the extent to which sub-central governments face limits on change tax rates and the tax base (e.g. 
expenditure or revenue capping). 
6 The construction of this index of fiscal control, based on the OECD data, is explained in Darby, Muscatelli 
and Roy (2002). 
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countries closest to the north-east corner of the graph are those in which the sub-central governments have the 
greatest degree of fiscal autonomy: that is they have a large share of total taxation and have greater control of 
taxation receipts. 
[Figure 2 about here]  
 
The UK the figures reflect local authorities’ relatively high control over a very small proportion of total 
taxation (council tax)7. Contrasts between federal states are also apparent: Switzerland grants its sub-central 
governments the greatest control over taxation in our sample, whilst the German and Austrian Länder have far 
less independent control. 
The Scandinavian countries warrant further investigation; their right to set local income tax rates is seen as the 
cornerstone of their local government autonomy, but in reality the systems are fairly restrictive. In Norway, 
local governments can set a local income tax within a range set by the central government. However, in 
practice, all the regions apply the maximum rate. Similarly, Municipalities are able to levy a tax on net 
wealth, within a centrally determined band, but again all set the same maximum permitted rate. Property 
taxes, commercial rates and energy taxes are also effectively constrained by Nordic and international 
standards, and whilst the imposition of user fees is permitted, these are required to be set below costs. Overall, 
sub-central fiscal autonomy is severely constrained. 
The Danish central government has in principle abstained from direct intervention to set constraints on local 
taxes. However, the system of formalised budget co-operation between central government and local 
government associations links the size of central transfers to local tax setting decisio ns and in reality appears 
to have a similarly restrictive effect on tax rates, Mønnesland (2002). Furthermore, it has been argued that the 
form of the negotiation process, with its frequent last minute changes to agreed budgets, hampers 
transparency and does not facilitate multi-year planning, see Daugaard (2002). In Sweden the central 
governments’ commitment to fiscal consolidation in the 1990s gave rise to various ad hoc  regulations that 
                                                               
7 Note that since the UK figures relate to 1998 they pre-date the introduction of the Scottish tax varying 
powers (the Tartan tax). However since the Scottish right to vary the rate of income tax has not yet be 
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have at least temporarily limited local autonomy, these include the imposition of a cap on tax rates between 
1991-93 and the central government taking a 50% share of any increase in tax revenue from 1997. As in a 
number of other countries, excessive fiscal autonomy has been considered to be a contributory factor in 
overall budgetary control and the sub-central tier has been forced to play a part in the fiscal consolidation 
effort.  
If devolved government and fiscal autonomy is designed with the objective of increasing accountability, a 
complex system, where various jurisdictions compete for the same tax base is may lead to a lack of 
transparency (Tanzi, 2001). As noted above, the choice of appropriate tax instruments for sub-central 
governments presents some problems in the light of issues such as: the mobility of factors of production 
across jurisdictions; the need to balance fiscal autonomy with some degree of revenue distribution between 
richer and poorer regions; and the need to avoid complexity. 
While some countries have devolved business taxes, including Austria, Belgiu m, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Switzerland, these do not constitute a substantial share of regional or local revenues. Instead, attention tends 
to focus on property taxation and taxes or tax surcharges on labour income. Dependence on business activity 
also generates incentives to over invest in business infrastructure and services to attract companies to the area. 
Another factor in choosing which tax to devolve is the predictability of revenues; corporate tax revenues are 
relatively more volatile, given their dependence on cyclical activity, than property, income, wealth or sales 
taxes, so undue reliance on corporate taxes could necessitate income guarantee schemes. 
Regional sales taxes are common in the US, but are less feasible within European countries where devolved 
regions are far smaller than US states, and in any case there are EU wide limits on sales taxes. Property taxes 
have the advantage of immobility of the tax base, but to the extent that some beneficiaries of services are not 
homeowners, the costs of provision are less perceptible; also the tax base for property taxes generally grows 
relatively little over time. For these reasons, attention has increasingly turned to taxes or tax surcharges on 
labour income. To date, what evidence exists suggests that labour migration may be less of a problem than 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
exercised, and in any case would have a very small impact on total Scottish tax revenues, it is fair to say that 
devolution has so far changed the position on financial autonomy very little. 
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some observers had feared in so far as there is little evidence that small tax differentials have led to major 
movements in population within EU countries. 
User charges and fees 
It is also possible to comp are the extent to which individual consumers or companies contribute directly to the 
provision of for services by the public sector, via user charges and fees including collective and co-payment 
arrangements – the ‘other’ catergory in Figure 1. By the very nature of public goods it is not surprising that 
this category makes up the smallest component of total sub-central government revenues. Further, the scope 
for user charges is likely to remain limited given legitimate concerns over access by low income groups. 
(Reimbursement of charges via the benefit system can be a necessary though imperfect solution.) Elsewhere, 
the scope to extend user charges may be limited to the extent that the delivery of key services has already 
been privatised. However, concern o ver the distortionary effects of tax financing, fairness and a wish to make 
costs more perceptible to consumers, are all factors that potentially support increases in the scope of user 
charges.  
The OECD has been critical of low reliance of user charges various countries, e.g. in the areas of child care, 
care of the elderly and pharmaceuticals. Trends in these areas suggest that take -up of free services is booming 
and supply-side rationing is considerable, Atkinson and van den Noord. (2001). The provision o f services free 
of charge, or without making costs perceptible, obviously risks prompting excessive demand and hitting 
supply constraints, since the social costs of supply are largely irrelevant for the individual. User charges offer 
the potential to gain more information about price sensitivity of demand for services and can potentially 
render demand pressure directly influential rather than being expressed indirectly and imperfectly through the 
electoral system. Demand pressures may also be influential on supply side efficiency. However, user charging 
will be viable only if the costs of collection and of compensation through the benefit system are low relative 
to the sums that can be levied and the efficiency gains that can result. Countries that have tried to increase 
reliance on fees and charges have generally aimed to strike a balance between co-payment and maximum 
contributions to avoid imposing unduly high expenses on some households.  
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Borrowing Autonomy 
The ability of any level of government to borrow can be helpful in facilitating short -term smoothing and to 
finance investment projects. However, threats to fiscal sustainability can derive from insufficiently hard 
budget constraints, and a lack of expenditure restraint. These macroeconomic consideratio ns lead many 
central governments to place restrictions on the ability of sub-central authorities to borrow, see for example 
Pisauro (2001) and Rodden (2002) for more detailed discussions of these issues. Figure 3 shows an index of 
borrowing autonomy from Rodden (op cit .).  
[Figure 3 about here]  
It is interesting to note that there is sometimes very little relation between the degree of decentralisation in 
spending and borrowing autonomy. For instance, in France regional and local authorities have considerable 
latitude in deciding how much to borrow for capital expenditure, although borrowing is not allowed to cover 
current expenditure or to refinance existing loans.  
In Germany, the Länder and local authorities can only borrow for investment purposes, in proportion to their 
financial capacity, and subject to agreement by the Länd’s interior ministry. Spain also sets limits to total debt 
service spending and only allows short-term borrowing to cover cash-flow requirements and long-term 
borrowing to finance public investment projects. However, Joumard and Varoudakis (2000) argue that in the 
absence of penalties, these rules are not enforced effectively. They suggest that non-authorisation of access to 
credit markets has had the result that sub-central authorities make greater use bank loans which are less 
effectively regulated, but more expensive. Deficit restraint at sub-central level in recent years has been 
attributed to the annual programmes of deficit reduction that are bilaterally negotiated between the State and 
each region, rather than controls on borrowing. 
Elsewhere too, the Maastricht criteria, and subsequently the Stability and Growth Pact, have forced the 
imposition of greater controls over borrowing by sub-central governments. For instance, Austria introduced 
an ‘internal’ Stability Pact in January 1999 to help ensure that the overall deficit position for all levels of 
government does not exceed 3%. This is done by allowing very little margin for borrowing by sub-central 
tiers of government, who are o nly permitted to run an aggregate deficit of 0.3% of GDP.  One possible 
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justification of the low margin is that temporary deterioration that is best covered by temporary borrowing is 
likely to be caused by the operation of automatic stabilisers which are largely the concern of central 
government.  
Italy has imposed a similar ‘internal pact’, but a problem with such ad hoc solutions is that they might place 
too my much of a constraint on public investment. This is a well-known criticism of the EU Stability and 
Growth Pact in contrast to the ‘golden rule’ for borrowing adopted in the UK. Presently, within the UK the 
devolved administrations face the same constraints as a central government department i.e. it is possible to 
carry over underspending, and limited overspending is allowed via the Reserve, HM Treasury (2002).  
However, if the UK is to adopt the EU’s Stability and Growth pact in the future, this may result in less 
flexibility for the current three year spending plans. 
Imbalances in Expenditure and Financial Autonomy in the Devolution Process 
We have noted a number of cases in which movement toward fiscal autonomy has lagged behind the 
decentralisation of spending; this has particularly been true when political considerations were dominant in 
motivating the initial change. The experience of Italy offers a clear example of the kind of problems that this 
mismatch can give rise to, and illustrates how these problems can be exacerbated when central government 
also imposes standards on local provision.   
Specifically, during the 1970s reforms had been aimed at simplification of the tax system and regaining 
central government control at a time of macroeconomic crisis. These reforms actually reduced the extent of 
sub-central fiscal autonomy, but at the same time  spending responsibilities were progressively devolved. 
Particular areas of tension emerged in the provision of health and transport services where the regions were 
given key responsibilities for service delivery. The system of grant finance was based on historical spending 
shares with insufficient reference to performance or needs, and failed to promote efficiency and weak 
incentives to contain spending.  Conditional grants often took on the character of entitlements, through central 
government imposition of “essential” standards. As Bordignon (2000) and Bosi and Tabellini (1995) note, 
this led to a clear problem of ‘moral hazard’, with regions blissfully running spending overruns in key areas, 
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knowing that the central government would bail them out8. This situation, in which the system of vertical 
transfers rewarded profligate and inefficient regional governments, obviously worked against fiscal 
responsibility and accountability of the regions. The Italian case is an extreme example, due to the particular 
administrative framework that allowed budget overruns and a political situation that encouraged bail-outs. 
However, similar problems can be identified elsewhere, in relation to specific areas of expenditure. 
In Denmark, high growth in expenditure on childcare and care of the elderly since the 1990s reflects central 
government policy. Fiscal balance has not been a major concern of the local providers since additional 
spending has typically been funded by higher revenues and higher provision in subsequent years. Local 
governments have repeatedly blamed overruns on agreed spending on the centrally imposed objectives and 
regulations, and  have resorted to unplanned tax hikes, while parliamentarians have criticised them for not 
meeting centrally initiated objectives and not complying with negotiated budgetary limits, Dauguaard (2002). 
However, it is clear that the central government has effectively separated the discretion to decide policy from 
the responsibility to finance spending. The existence of targets that are regularly not met lack and credibility 
and raises moral hazard problems.  Reforms proposed by the OECD and others include imposing financial 
penalties on tax increases, and extending local discretion to other forms of taxation, tax allowances and user 
fees, Bibee and Goglio (2002). 
These examples serve to illustrate that if central government is intent on maintaining the level of key public 
services, sub-central governments can exert real pressures on the central government to increase vertical 
transfers, unless these are explicitly prohibited by law. Clearly, if budget constraints are to be binding, lower 
level governments should suffer the consequences of their own mismanagement and should not be able to rely 
on transfers from above to bail them out of financial difficulties.   
Since 1992, the Italian central government has progressively handed over greater fiscal autonomy to sub-
central governments, and this has been accompanied by a corresponding reduction in transfers. Between 1993 
and 2000 a number of different tax reforms were introduced, involving experimentation with various types of 
                                                               
8 The constitutional court has sided with the regions and ordered central government to provide additional 
grants to cover the costs of providing nationally mandated “essential” services. 
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sub-central taxation; these have ranged from health taxes to a tax on business value added (IRAP) and an 
income tax (IRPEF) surcharge. However, despite these reforms, vertical transfers through conditional grants 
remain an important feature of Italian public finances and the central government has found it almost 
impossible to reform the allocation of central grants to reflect objective factors rather than historic allo cations, 
and to exclude the possibility of bail-out. 
The Spanish experience is also of interest. As noted above, devolution of revenue raising powers lagged the 
rapid decentralisation of spending competencies. So, the process has been characterised by growing 
imbalances between tax assignments and expenditure functions. Figure 4 puts this experience into context. 
Specifically, each point shows the share of sub-central tax and non-tax revenues excluding grants plotted 
against expenditure by sub-central governments, where both are given as percentages of the appropriate 
general government totals. The vertical distance between each point and the 45-degree line shows the extent 
to which sub-central jurisdictions are dependent on central government grants. 
[Figure 4 about here]  
The figure on the left shows the position of each of the European countries using the most recent figures 
available in the 2001 edition of GFS and the right hand panel shows how the position of Spain has evolved 
over time. 
Initially revenue raising powers of the Spanish regions were confined to the so -called “ceded taxes”, mainly 
on property. As recently as 1994, the ACs relied on government grants or tax-sharing arrangements for up to 
96% of their expenditure. Their fiscal discretion was further limited by the fact that they could determine tax 
base or rates on only 22 per cent of their tax revenues, compared with around 90 per cent for Belgium, 
Denmark, Japan and Switzerland (OECD, 1999). In the period 1994-96 ACs were allowed to obtain a share of 
the personal income tax raised in their own territory, and also began to make greater use of fees and user 
charges. By 1996, the percentage of own revenues in the ACs had risen to 18%. In 1997 a formal agreement 
progressively increased the range of taxes available to ACs (on wealth and property transfers) as well as 
allowing them a greater share of their own revenues from personal taxation.  
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As mentioned earlier, another feature of the Spanish system, both on expenditure and revenue is the 
asymmetry across regions. Some ACs are able to exercise control over more tax rates and tax credits than 
others, leaving open a range of distortions. For example, special corporate income tax regimes apply to the 
three historic Basque Country territories (Alava, Gu ipuzcoa, Vizcaya) and to Navarra and these provide 
several more generous tax incentives to companies than the general regime. Quite apart from questioning 
whether the Basque Country’s investment tax credits, additional reliefs for business start-ups and companies 
who locate their headquarters in the region are efficient uses of taxpayers’ resources, the fact that other ACs 
do not have the option to adopt similar schemes is a source of tension that has resulted in challenges in the 
Spanish and European Court. Arguably, although it is still evolving, the asymmetric and multi-speed nature of 
the Spanish reforms has resulted in a complex tax system, which achieves greater autonomy at the expense of 
less transparency. 
Even in countries like the Spain and the UK, where asymmetric devolution settlements are justified for 
historical or cultural reasons (e.g. in the UK, the existence of a separate Scottish education and legal system 
prior to devolution), unless these exceptions are explicitly costed as part of a comprehensive regional 
financing system, it is clear that tensions between regional and central governments, across regions, and with 
European policies on tax harmonization, can create considerable difficulties.  
Conclusions  
While decentralisation is sometimes driven primarily by political considerations, economists have 
traditionally seen benefits on the grounds that decentralised provision and fiscal autonomy can promote the 
efficiency and accountability of sub-central governments.  
However, overlapping and poorly defined central and local competencies, the use of central government 
directives, entitlements and conditional grants act to prevent independence and full fiscal responsibility at the 
sub-central level, and can result in excessive expenditure that is unchecked by limited incentives to raise own 
revenues. Competition over the tax base can also easily destroy some of the potential benefits of fiscal 
autonomy.  
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Equalisation schemes are likely to be required to align sufficient revenue sources with expenditure 
commitments. However, excessive degrees of fiscal equalisation can work against the gains in accountability 
that would otherwise derive from fiscal autonomy. The use of grants and transfers in equalisation systems 
should pay attention to expenditure need, costs of delivery and fiscal capacity. Formula based allocations 
based on predicted revenues, indicators of needs and costs of provision should increase fiscal transparency 
and reduce the need for frequent costly negotiations.  
So, the decentralisation process should be carefully designed to be transparent, with clearly defined 
competencies for different jurisdictions. In areas where the central government wants to retain a major role in 
setting standards of provision it should take back financing responsibility accordingly, and elsewhere it should 
abstain from detailed regulation. If necessary setting defined minimum standards should replace notions of 
standard entitlements, allowing fuller autonomy in both spending and financing decisions. 
Most countries that have granted a greater degree of fiscal autonomy to their regions have done so through a 
greater delegation of taxes on immobile factors, or on personal income. Where taxes are devolved to lower 
tiers, the choice of tax and any limits set should pay heed to tax externalities. Many countries leave the 
responsibility for tax collection with central government, which can ensure equal effort is put into collection 
across the country and can be easier administratively, even if there is a system of local tax surcharges. 
User charges may be a useful source of revenues and can be helpful in relaxing supply constraints and 
strengthening the influence of demand. By charging at the point of delivery they are also highly perceptible 
and relieve pressure on general tax revenues. However, the scope for user charges tends to be limited, either 
because of relatively high collection costs in comparison to the sums that can be levied, or because of concern 
over access by low income groups, or because the kind of services best suited to charging have already been 
privatised.  
For budget constraints to be binding, lower level governments should not be able to rely on transfers from 
above to bail them out of financial difficulties. Hence there is a case for devoting energy to good institutional 
design, for example by introducing a binding ceiling for transfers and limits on borrowing, probably 
accompanied by a system of incentives and sanctions.  
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In a number of countries, asymmetric and multi-speed reforms have resulted in considerable added 
complexity. Where asymmetric devolution settlements are justified on historical grounds they should be 
explicitly costed as part of a comprehensive regional financing system, to avoid tensions. In our view, the 
persistence of asymmetries cannot be justified on economic grounds and is unlikely to be sustainable. 
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Table 1:  Sub-central Government Expenditure by Function 
as a pecentage of General Government totals for each category . 
 
   
Education 
 
 
 
Health 
 
 
 
Social 
Security 
and 
Welfare 
 
Housing 
and 
Local 
Amen-
ities  
 
Public 
Order 
and 
Safety 
 
Econ’c  
Affairs   
and 
Services 
 
All  
Func-
tions 
FEDERAL  COUNTRIES  
Germany (1996) 96 28 79 93 92 64 38 
Switzerland (1999) 90 31 23 85 93 37 47 
Austria (1998) 72 48 9 25 3 n.a. 31 
Spain (1997) 71 31 6 93 41 60 32 
UNITARY COUNTRIES  
Denmark  (2000) 46 95 55 33 13 35 46 
Norway (1998) 63 77 19 87 17 17 34 
France (1993) 37 2 9 82 28 18 17 
Netherlands  (1997) 33 5 14 79 25 26 22 
UK (1998) 67 0 20 41 52 29 22 
Ireland (1997) 22 48 6 70 100 70 25 
 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics, 2001 edition. 
 
Notes: 
1. Figures are given for the most recent year available, as noted in brackets after the country name.  
2. For the federal states, the single sub-central government figure combines the totals at federal and local 
level, this provides a clearer comparison with unitary countries where only a single figure is available 
(even for countries that have a multi-tier system of regions, and local level government).  
3. Spain is included with the federal countries above, although it is not strictly a federation. It is often 
referred to as ‘quasi-federal’ or ‘regionalised state’ since the constitution does not include a federal 
distribution of powers and the Spanish Parliament can transfer legislative and executive functions without 
any statutory reform. See Russell Barter (2000) for a more detailed typology of international forms of 
regional government. 
4. Disaggregated data are not available for all European countries in GFS so a number of countries had to be 
excluded from this table (notably Finland, Italy, Belgium and Portugal). 
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Table 2:  The Evolution of  Sub-Central Government Spending since 1970 
Figures are given as percentages of General Government totals. 
 
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 latest 
Germany 45 44 44 41 41 41 38 (1998) 
Switzerland1 56 55 53 52 50 48 47 (1999) 
Austria  30 32 31 30 30 31 31 (1998) 
Spain  - - 11 21 30 30 32 (1997) 
UNITARY COUNTRIES 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 latest 
Denmark 1  44 47 48 43 44 44 46 (2000) 
Sweden  45 44 40 37 37 31 34 (1998) 
Norway  38 40 33 33 32 32 33 (1997) 
Finland 38 38 39 40 41 34 36 (1998) 
France  17 17 16 16 18 18 17 (1997) 
Italy2 - - 27 27 27 24 28 (1999) 
Belgium3 - - 14 12 11 11 11 (1997) 
Netherlands  - 27 25 26 23 24 22 (1997) 
United Kingdom  30 30 26 24 25 22 22 (1998) 
Ireland  27 28 27 25 23 24 25 (1997) 
Portugal  - 7 - - 8 8 10 (1998) 
 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics, 2001 edition. 
 
Notes: 
1. Figures for Switzerland relate to 1984 and 1991 rather than 1985 and 1990, due to constraints of data 
availability. Likewise for Denmark a figure for 1972 has had to be substituted for 1970. 
2. GFS data for Italy has been supplemented by data provided in Giarda (2001). 
3. Belgium has effectively moved from a unitary structure to a federal structure. However, whilst the OECD 
provides some information for all three levels of sub-central government in Belgium (local government, 
communities and regional government), to date the GFS has kept its disaggregation to central and local 
government where it appears that the federal layer has been included with the centre. To this extent, the 
above figures understate the true extent of devolved spending in Belgium. 
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Figure 1:  Composition of Sub-Central Government Revenues 
as a percentage of their total revenues  
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 Grants      Taxes       Other 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics 2001 
Figures relate to 2000 for Denmark; to 1999 for Austria, Sweden and Switzerland; to 1998 for 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Portugal, Norway, UK; and to 1997 for France and the 
Netherlands. 
 
Figure 2:  The Importance of Sub-Central Levels of Government 
and the Extent of Fiscal Control 
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Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics 2001, OECD (1999) and own calculations 
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Figure 3:  Index of Borrowing Autonomy 
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Source: Rodden (2002).  
Note: The index is bounded between 1 and 5 where 1 = no borrowing autonomy and 5=high 
borrowing autonomy and the period assessed is 1986-1996 where feasible. The light bar relates 
to the local level of government where these figures are available. The darker bars relate to 
state/regional level government. 
 
Figure 4:  Fiscal Imbalances: Tax and Non-Tax Revenues  
and Expenditure of Sub-Central Governments  
(a) Cross Country Comparison (b) Decentralisation in Spain 
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Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics 
1. Revenues include taxes, fees and other sources of non-tax revenues but exclude grants. 
2. The figures are expressed as percentages of general government totals. Transfers from central 
government to lower tiers of government are excluded from the general government totals. The date for 
which each country’s data is plotted is as given in the notes to Figure 1,  note that this means the figures 
for the UK pre -date devolution.  
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